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Abstract
Advocacy campaigns against the “warehousing” of refu-
gees in camps suggest the facilitation of local integration 
as a preferred policy option for states, international organ-
izations, and non-governmental organizations . This paper 
argues that the institutions, assumptions, and habits that 
the international refugee protection system has developed 
over the past forty years hinder our understanding of local 
integration as a fundamentally political and refugee- and 
host-driven process . The paper uses African case stud-
ies to show how local integration is part of broader pro-
cesses of local politics . It proposes alternatives to three key 
assumptions of conventional policy-oriented approaches 
to local integration: (1) that local integration is a form of 
local politics rather than institutionalizable process for an 
exceptional category of people (e .g ., refugees); (2) that local 
integration is negotiated by refugees based on a range of 
legitimacy claims and forms of exchange rather than pri-
marily based on “refugee rights”-related claims; and (3) 
that local integration is enabled by hosts for a variety of 
reasons rather than mainly for reasons related to the idea 
of “refugee protection .”
Résumé
Les campagnes contre le « stockage » des réfugiés dans 
des camps suggèrent la facilitation de l’intégration locale 
comme option à privilégier par les États, organisations 
internationales et organisations non gouvernementales . Le 
présent article soutient que les institutions, hypothèses et 
habitudes développées par le système de protection interna-
tionale des réfugiés au cours des quarante dernières années 
entravent notre compréhension de l’intégration locale en 
tant que processus fondamentalement politique mis en 
œuvre par les réfugiés et les hôtes . La recherche s’appuie sur 
des études de cas africains pour montrer comment l’inté-
gration locale fait partie du processus plus large de poli-
tique locale et propose des alternatives à trois hypothèses 
clés des approches classiques à l’intégration locale axées 
sur les politiques : 1) que l’intégration locale est une forme 
de politique locale plutôt qu’un processus institutionnali-
sable pour une catégorie exceptionnelle d’individus (par 
ex ., les réfugiés); 2) que l’intégration locale est négocié par 
les réfugiés à partir d’une série de revendications de légiti-
mité et de formes d’échange et non plus principalement à 
partir de revendications liées aux « droits des réfugiés »; 3) 
que l’intégration locale est permise par les hôtes pour une 
variété de raisons, plutôt que pour des raisons essentielle-
ment liées à l’idée de la « protection des réfugiés . »
Introduction
The “local integration” of refugees is usually conceived of 
as a policy option: something which professional institu-
tions could and should plan and implement as a response 
to displacement . From the perspective of these institutions, 
such as United Nations agencies, governments, and non-
governmental organizations, this conception is understand-
able, given that they are debating their own programming 
options and impacts . However, this paper argues that a 
policy-oriented approach significantly limits the possibil-
ity of understanding the process of local integration and 
the contexts which facilitate or hinder it . I follow Oliver 
Bakewell in arguing that academics must move beyond the 
assumptions and categorizations of policy-oriented think-
ing and bring the interaction between refugees and others 
“back into history”1 by applying “broader social scientific 
theories of social [and political] transformation and human 
mobility” rather than “privileging their position as forced 
migrants as the primary explanatory factor” for protection 
outcomes .2
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This paper starts by outlining several key assumptions 
which the “refugee protection industry” has adopted about 
itself and about refugees in the past forty years which pre-
dispose institutions against local integration . It then dis-
cusses a prominent advocacy campaign which critiques 
some of these assumptions: namely the “anti-warehousing” 
campaign which promotes local integration as an alterna-
tive policy solution to the encampment of refugees . While 
this campaign against camps is valuable within the policy 
field, I argue that in critiquing camps and advocating for 
integration its policy focus nonetheless maintains three 
related conceptual blinkers . Firstly, it implies that local inte-
gration is an institutionalizable process for an exceptional 
category of people (e .g ., refugees); secondly, that refugees 
integrate through claiming “refugee rights”; and thirdly, 
that hosts enable integration with the aim of providing 
“refugee protection .”
In contrast, this paper uses predominantly rural African 
case studies to show how local integration is in practice 
part of broader processes of local politics . By local politics 
I mean a process through which individuals and groups 
negotiate with local power holders for access to needed 
resources . This approach places refugees and hosts at the 
centre of the process, rather than professional refugee pro-
tection institutions, and assumes that refugees are political 
actors, using political strategies and tactics just like other 
individuals and groups . This argument is based on an analy-
sis which includes recognizing a range of legitimacy claims 
used locally by refugees, apart from “refugee rights,” and a 
variety of reasons why hosts allow and enable integration, 
apart from reasons relating to “refugee protection .”
The paper ends by returning to the policy field and 
assessing potential policy-based critiques of such an empir-
ical and political understanding of local integration . It con-
cludes that as local integration is largely a process which 
happens without or in spite of currently dominant insti-
tutional interventions, future interventions which wish 
to support rather than undermine local integration must 
first have the conceptual tools for understanding its locally 
specific logics .
Framing Local Integration
Before outlining the policy debate about local integration 
as an alternative to refugee encampment, let me clarify my 
understanding of local integration . The term has been used 
in many, often conflicting, ways .3 I am not referring to the 
various types of purportedly self-sufficient refugee settle-
ments, where refugees are largely isolated from local popu-
lations by host governments and international actors .4 Even 
though these settlements may reduce some of the worst 
economic dependency problems of fully-catered camps, as 
it were, they do not change the essential separateness of refu-
gees and therefore their removal from local political life .
Some authors define “local integration” in terms of 
a final state of similarity to (although not necessarily of 
assimilation with) local populations . Jacobsen, for example, 
describes what she calls de facto integration as “where the 
lived, everyday experience of refugees is that of being part 
of the local community .” This includes lack of physical dan-
ger; freedom of movement in the host country and free-
dom to return to the home country; access to sustainable 
livelihoods; access to government services like education, 
health, and housing; social inclusion through intermar-
riage and social interactions with the host community; and 
comparable standards of living in comparison with the host 
community .5 Jacobsen also emphasizes the importance of 
formal legal status, ideally permanent residence or citizen-
ship in the host country, as the final step to full integration, 
since without it de facto integrated refugees remain vulner-
able .6 Crisp defines local integration primarily as reflecting 
the “assumption that refugees will remain indefinitely in 
their country of asylum and find a solution to their plight in 
that state,”7 in contrast to the assumption of temporariness 
inherent in camps and repatriation programs .
Jacobsen’s description of “being integrated” is valu-
able, as is Crisp’s focus on “indefiniteness,” especially since 
both include the understanding that integration need not 
preclude eventual repatriation or cross-border livelihoods 
and identities . However, these authors retain many of the 
assumptions about the refugee protection system which I 
analyze below—such as the primacy of international and 
national law, and the “refugee” label—by underemphasiz-
ing the social and political process of integration and the 
local actors involved (not only “refugee protection” profes-
sionals) . I believe that a very broad, process-focused defin-
ition of integration is necessary in order to overcome many 
of the thought-blinkers “refugee-studies” academics have 
developed . I define local integration as a process of negoti-
ating access to local legitimacy and entitlement on the basis 
of a variety of value systems determined by local power 
holders in dialogue with refugees . Such a broad analysis of 
negotiation strategies, local value systems and local actors is 
necessary to develop a subtle, rather than a blueprint, debate 
on integration . I will return to this below .
There is an extensive literature on the integration of 
refugees in northern countries, focusing on the interaction 
between the individual/small group and the host state/society 
around issues of cultural assimilation, economic access, etc .8 
There are fewer studies on refugee integration in the con-
text of “mass” movements in the “South,” but it is definitely 
a phenomenon that occurs more often than is academically 
observed .9 The examples of local integration I will discuss are 
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all African and mainly rural or small-town based,10 including 
on my own research among Mozambican refugees in South 
Africa (2002–2006) .11 The analysis applies equally, however, 
to locally integrated urban-based refugees, who now make up 
over half of recorded refugees worldwide .12
Finally, my understanding of local integration applies 
at all stages of the displacement process .13 Refugee protec-
tion institutions commonly distinguish between interim 
or “temporary” responses to displacement, where the main 
policy options are seen to be encampment or local integra-
tion, and “durable solutions” to displacement, which are 
voluntary repatriation, local integration or third country 
resettlement . The a priori distinction between “temporary” 
and “durable” solutions is largely an institutional and policy 
construction, since the displaced themselves rarely have a 
clearly phased or linear interpretation of the temporariness 
or durableness of their current life situation .
There are many refugees, especially in African host coun-
tries, who self-settle and start integrating as soon as they 
cross the border, usually without any organized intervention 
on their behalf . Some authors with an intervention-focus 
have also suggested that local integration should be planned 
for by refugee protection agencies even in the immediate 
emergency phase of refugee influx, and not only as a second-
phase, medium-term option .14 Jacobsen explicitly focuses 
on protracted conflicts during which refugees integrate in 
the host country while waiting for many decades to “return 
home .”15 Finally, integration is a concern for those refugees 
whose countries of origin have achieved some peace and 
stability but where the country of asylum offers different 
opportunities, has become “home” in various ways,16 or has 
become enmeshed with the country of origin as a locality 
for cross-border livelihoods .17
While local integration is potentially an option at all 
stages of the refugee experience and for individual as 
well as large-scale refugee movements, this is not to sug-
gest that it is always an option, or always the best option, 
or that all refugees wish to integrate in the short or long 
term . However, it is an option which is often overlooked 
or actively prevented by intervening institutions because 
of the assumptions about refugees and refugee protection 
outlined below . In order to understand in what situations 
refugees and hosts are likely to succeed in integrating on 
their own, when targeted outsider interventions are likely 
to facilitate or hinder the process, or when other forms of 
intervention are needed, we need a clearer understanding 
of the integration process itself .
Before developing my approach to local integration as 
political negotiation, I briefly outline the assumptions about 
refugee protection interventions that dominate mainstream 
discussions, including the anti-warehousing debate .
Encampment and Local Integration  
as Policy Options
Since the 1970s, the major international actors in refugee 
protection and the majority of academic commentators have 
seen local integration of refugees in poor host countries 
as problematic .18 In terms of international expenditure,19 
academic attention,20 and media and popular perception, 
refugee camps have become the dominant response to 
most mass displacement situations by both host states and 
the international community . This is especially the case in 
Africa and increasingly in Asia .21 The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
many states see camps as the best interim or preparation 
stage where displaced people are held and helped until the 
conditions are ripe for the preferred “durable solution” of 
repatriation to their country of origin .
In reality, this has not always been the case . For thou-
sands of years, it has been the norm for people who have 
moved away from conflict (just like people who moved 
for other reasons) to integrate locally, and local integra-
tion was espoused as the natural and ideal solution at the 
inception of the international refugee regime in the 1950s .22 
Furthermore, a large proportion of displaced people today, 
whether refugees or internally displaced, still self-settle and 
integrate, often without contact with official state or inter-
national assistance programs . Estimates of independently 
self-settled refugees are notoriously unreliable,23 but they 
have ranged from 30 per cent to 75 per cent of the total num-
ber of refugees in Africa .24
There are currently approximately 2 .5 million refugees 
living in camps around the world, making up one-third 
of the refugees counted in the UNHCR’s global statistics . 
In contrast to global percentages, 60 per cent of UNHCR-
counted refugees in Africa are in camps .25 This does not 
include the much larger numbers of internally displaced 
persons also living in camps or camp-like settlements . The 
dominant characteristics of encampment are that camp 
residents are segregated from the local population and 
that they have limited freedom of movement or economic 
independence . Camps are often financed and managed by 
international organizations, while some are managed by 
host states .
The policy and practice of refugee encampment has 
developed historically in explicit opposition to the settle-
ment of refugees among the local population of the host 
country . Crisp describes the historical and political rea-
sons why host states in Africa increasingly rejected local 
integration of refugees from the 1970s onward in favour of 
encampment . These included concern about economic and 
environmental burdens in poor countries (and in richer 
countries), security concerns, anger at being “abandoned” 
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by richer nations, fear of the domestic ramifications of 
popular xenophobia, and the perceived need to reassert 
sovereignty over porous borders .26 Other writers note that 
host governments benefit from the international aid asso-
ciated with encampment, which would not be forthcoming 
for self-sufficient, integrated refugees .27 These arguments 
recognize a realist state-centric perspective and are based 
on the view that state rights (sovereignty) trump individual 
rights, and that citizen rights trump human rights . In this 
perspective, encampment is a legitimate means to prevent 
perceived threats and gain desired benefits for the state and 
for citizens without injuring any significant interests (since 
refugee interests are not considered a priori significant) .
The trend toward camps and away from local integration 
comes not only from states but also reflects an institutional 
logic within the international “refugee protection industry” 
today .28 This logic has seven elements which make it difficult 
for professional refugee protection institutions to recognize 
the localized and political nature of local integration .
First, refugee protection has become a specialized and 
bureaucratized industry with international, national, and 
non-governmental organizations dependent on recreating 
interventions for themselves .29 Social and political pro-
cesses which cannot be clearly traced to institutional inter-
ventions cannot be used to raise funds or claim positive 
impact . Second, beyond the immediate material incomes of 
specific organizations and specialists, there is a deeply held 
assumption that the responsibility for, as well as the cost of, 
refugee protection should lie with a centralized institution 
(the state or an international organization) rather than being 
diffused among the communities in which refugees might 
settle . Third, the idea that refugees can bring benefits to host 
communities, rather than only costs, is a common refrain 
in the mainstream refugee literature and in the publicity 
material of refugee assistance institutions, but interventions 
are rarely conceptualized around the resources and capaci-
ties which refugees have independently . Especially encamp-
ment is based on the assumption that all refugees are a prob-
lem and have problems; not that only those refugees who 
have problems and are problematic require assistance or 
intervention .
A fourth consequence of the bureaucratic focus is a tauto-
logical definition of who is a refugee: only those people who 
fit into an intervention-driven definition of refugee are 
counted and assisted; therefore a perception arises that all 
refugees are counted and assisted . Those refugees who self-
settle and integrate are often not counted at all in the offi-
cial statistics .30 Even in situations like Guinea, where only 
20 per cent of Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees are in 
camps, the greater visibility of camps “strongly [shapes] the 
image outsiders have of all the refugees .”31
Fifth, bureaucratization has led to a predilection for blue-
print “solutions” and standardized procedures, of which 
refugee camps are particularly replicable examples . The 
problems associated with importing camp models without 
consideration for local specificities have been discussed 
elsewhere .32 Sixth, in parallel to the programmatic special-
ization and blueprints, there have developed deep discursive 
specializations and blueprints . This includes the assump-
tion that a discourse of refugee identification and refugee 
rights, as defined by international conventions, will in all 
cases be beneficial to the refugees concerned and therefore 
is desired by them . As Andrews points out,
UNHCR and humanitarian agencies commonly use the category 
of “refugee” in order to determine the population eligible for aid 
or resettlement . However, for understanding … how the displaced 
themselves negotiate their survival with their hosts, this demo-
graphic category obscures more than it reveals .33
Finally, the international agencies mandated with refugee 
protection, as well as many academics, have accepted some 
of the host states’ arguments against local integration .34 
Some authors argue convincingly that refugee protection is 
only possible with the co-operation of host states, and that 
their priorities and concerns must be taken into account .35 
This is clearly correct in terms of immediate advocacy goals . 
However, by accepting states’ fears of permanence as asso-
ciated with local integration, and therefore supporting 
“temporary” encampment interventions, international (and 
national) non-state actors have contributed to the construc-
tion of the refugee as a liminal and apolitical category, a 
temporary aberration in the “national order of things .”36 In 
addition to having wide-ranging practical implications for 
the lives and livelihoods of refugees, as well documented by 
authors like Smith and Harrell-Bond37 among others, this 
depoliticization and dehistoricization of refugees has deep 
disciplinary and theoretical effects on our ability to under-
stand how refugees actively respond on arrival in a new 
place .38
These assumptions about refugees made by host states and 
international refugee protection actors must be abandoned 
in order to understand local integration as an empirical, 
contextual, historical, and political process . Before describ-
ing this integration process in the next section, I briefly dis-
cuss the contribution of the “anti-warehousing” campaign, 
which for several years has been advocating against encamp-
ment and for increased use of local integration as a policy 
option in response to displacement .39 I argue that while 
this campaign has merits, it is misleading to present local 
integration as a different but functionally equivalent policy 
to encampment, in that it is something which professional 
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refugee protection institutions do in response to large-scale 
displacement of people . The “anti-warehousing” campaign 
is focused on identifying the problems with encampment, 
rather than understanding the process of integration per se . 
The campaign therefore challenges some of the assumptions 
underlying the logic of encampment and professionalized 
refugee protection, but not others .
In contrast to a state-centric logic, the dominant propon-
ents of the anti-warehousing campaign explicitly advance 
the primacy of international law (such as the 1951 UN 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1948 
Declaration of Human Rights) and human and individual 
rights in informing their judgments .40 The refugee rights 
codified in the Refugee Convention are presented as a min-
imum standard to which host states and especially inter-
national institutions such as the UNHCR have subscribed . 
Measured against this standard, refugee encampment is pre-
sented as not only illegitimate, but also “unnecessary, waste-
ful, hypocritical, counterproductive, unlawful, and morally 
unacceptable .”41
As part of this argument, sovereignty and citizenship rights, 
as emphasized by host states, are acknowledged, but evidence 
is presented to debunk many of the security and resource com-
petition concerns routinely expressed by host governments .42 
Smith, who identifies long-term camps not only as dehuman-
izing in general but also as racist, spells out the moral element 
very clearly . He points out that when Europeans were design-
ing a system of refugee protection for other Europeans in the 
1950s, camps were considered an unconscionable throwback 
to dictatorial practice and local integration was the assumed 
and natural route for refugees . If the architects of today’s 
camps, including international actors and host governments, 
considered refugees as their own equals, they would not con-
sign them to “warehouses .”43
Regarding the assumption that professional institutions 
are the best placed to protect refugees, the anti-warehous-
ing campaigners document rights abuses by the UNHCR 
and international NGOs in detail . They criticize the con-
trolling approach to refugees in camps which often stems 
from narrowly interpreted organizational imperatives and 
the pressure on institutions to continue interventions for 
their own benefit rather than a consideration of refugees as 
human beings with rights and desires .44 The conviction that 
refugees are a potential asset and not a burden is central to 
the anti-camps argument, which they document with exten-
sive examples . Smith and Harrell-Bond and Verdirame also 
explicitly refer to the greater psychological well-being and 
health of self-settled and integrating refugees in comparison 
with camp-based refugees .45
I agree with the anti-warehousing campaigners and most 
commentators on refugee issues that human rights and the 
rights enshrined in the Refugee Convention are expressions 
of what every human being (which is what refugees are in 
the first instance) should have access to in their lives . What 
I am arguing is that conventional assumptions about refu-
gee protection limit our ability to understand how refugees 
actually access and enjoy these rights and resources . There 
are three key assumptions, all related, which the anti-ware-
housing debate does not move away from sufficiently, and 
which are critical to answering the empirical question of 
how refugees access rights and resources and therefore to 
understanding the process of local integration .
The first assumption is that refugees are a particular group 
of people, categorically different from “locals” or other kinds 
of migrants, with different means of accessing rights and 
resources, whose actions can be understood through a spe-
cialized knowledge . I suggest that refugees negotiate access 
to rights in relation to local power holders like any other 
political actor . A second, related, assumption is that a dis-
course of refugee rights is always the strategically best way 
of assisting refugees . I submit that often refugees use other 
identities to claim rights to resources and power in a local 
context, such as ethnic identification, kinship networks, pol-
itical clients or allies, etc . In some contexts, the refugee iden-
tification does indeed facilitate access to resources, but in 
others it can be counterproductive and alienating . The third 
assumption is that “durable solutions” and “refugee protec-
tion” are the result of specific interventions by specialized 
refugee protection organizations based on internationally 
defined refugee rights . I suggest that local integration often 
happens as a function of local relationships, in the absence 
of specific refugee protection interventions, and that it can 
be actively hindered by them . In fact, refugee protection can 
be seen as a by-product of successful integration processes, 
rather than integration being a result of refugee protection . 
These three points will be discussed in the following sections 
on the basis of African case studies .
Local Integration as Political Negotiation
My argument is that empirically, local integration is in the 
first instance a social and political process of incorporat-
ing newcomers into an existing political community . This 
process may or may not be connected to a discursive and 
institutional framework of “temporary” or “durable” solu-
tions to displacement that assumes certain things about 
refugees, refugee rights, the role of the state and the role of 
international organizations .
The underlying questions for understanding integra-
tion as a political process is: how do refugees (actively) get 
what they need to live? This question is empirical and situa-
tional, not normative and universal: what does enable refu-
gees to access the things they need, rather than who should 
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protect them . Academics should consistently be looking 
at how refugees gain access to actual power and resources 
locally, as achieved through negotiation with a variety of 
actors, some of whom but certainly not all may be agents 
of the state, international organizations, or NGOs . Within 
this framework, I agree fully with Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond’s assertion that “socio-economic integration is the 
best solution from the point of view of the refugees’ enjoy-
ment of their fundamental rights”46 because it gives them 
more space to actively negotiate access to rights and resour-
ces with whatever local power holder can actually enable 
those rights at any particular time .
There are three guiding questions for a political analysis 
of refugee integration:
1 . Who are the local actors who control access to power 
and resources and what are their interests?
2 . What is the relationship of (different categories of) 
refugees to those actors—what resources do refugees 
have which these actors can use, or which threats do 
they (are they perceived to) present?
3 . What tactics and strategies do refugees use within the 
framework of these relationships to negotiate access to 
power and resources?47
Local Power Holders and Interests
Local actors are all actors who impact directly on the local 
conditions in which refugees live . In the rural context of my 
own research in South Africa, powerful actors have been 
village headmen and religious leaders but also locally based 
officials of national state organs, such as the Department of 
Home Affairs, which is responsible for identity documenta-
tion . In this conception, local actors may also include staff 
members of international organizations, if they are present in 
that locality . I am counting state and international actors as 
“local” in this context, since the relevant points of interaction 
for refugees are the locally-based individual representatives 
of such larger institutions, and the ways in which those indi-
viduals act empirically, which may be quite different from 
the legal mandates or institutional interests their structures 
theoretically represent .48 A focus on the specifics of the local 
is important, since, as numerous case studies point out, the 
conditions for integration are different from one district to 
another and from a rural area to the adjoining town, not least 
because different local actors hold power .49
In spite of much debate on “weak” and “failed” states 
in Africa and elsewhere, the state always remains a central 
power holder in refugee affairs . Particularly the question of 
legal documentation, as controlled by the state, is often a 
crucial constraining factor for refugee options .50 The inclu-
sion of a variety of actors in the analysis is not to negate the 
importance of state power to constrain or enable access to 
rights in many situations . However, the particular character 
of state power in a particular locality, including the specific 
meaning and use of documentation, cannot be taken for 
granted .
Who can access documentation or who needs it is not 
always a question of the law and formal state policy . As 
Hovil points out about self-settled Sudanese refugees in 
Moyo district of Uganda, many have avoided the entire con-
cept of refugeedom by paying tax and carrying “graduated 
poll tax tickets that act as a means of official identification” 
virtually equivalent to citizenship .51 This is effective even 
though the government requires refugees to be registered 
and live in camps . Bakewell writes that legal documenta-
tion was only relevant for Angolan refugees self-settled in 
remote and rural Zambian villages if they wanted to travel 
to towns to work, and that many “locals” had a range of 
different identity documents, including refugee cards, for 
different purposes .52 In South Africa, many Mozambicans 
with the requisite social or financial capital were “adopted” 
by South African families of the same ethnic group and 
acquired citizenship documentation through them .53
There are also cases where the state has little influence on 
border areas where refugees self-settle, such as in Zambia in 
the early 1990s .54 In the absence of the state, other signifi-
cant actors may be traditional leaders who control access to 
land and have an interest in increasing their political fol-
lowing; international organizations and NGOs who offer 
resources and have an interest in docile clients; and armed 
groups who offer or withdraw security and have an interest 
in recruits .
Matching actors and their interests also illustrates that 
different local actors will be most useful (or dangerous) to 
different groups of refugees depending on what resources 
the refugees bring with them and what strategies they are 
pursuing . In the Guinean case, for example, rural Mano 
refugees easily integrated in rural areas, where traditional 
authorities and the general population were the relevant 
local actors . Urban refugees from different ethnic groups did 
not have the resources, such as political clientage traditions, 
agricultural knowledge, and labour power, to negotiate with 
these actors and did not want to, and therefore addressed 
themselves to international actors and the state for aid by 
establishing a “spontaneous camp” in Thuo town .55
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond provide a sophisticated 
analysis of the roles and power relations between a pleth-
ora of actors involved in refugee protection in Kenya and 
Uganda .56 They include not only the mandates of the vari-
ous institutions, but their on-the-ground practices and indi-
vidual belief systems of staff members . What is needed in 
studying other refugee contexts, including local integration, 
is a similarly complex understanding of the powerful actors 
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and their interests and assumptions, with the understand-
ing that the roles of government and organized humanitar-
ian actors may be quite marginal in certain contexts .
Refugee Resources
In the ideal international system of refugee protection, the 
main resource of refugees in relation to host states and 
refugee rights organizations is their ability to claim legal 
and moral capital as refugees, which is seen as sufficient 
to access resources and protection . In reality, however, 
refugees can rarely access rights purely on this basis, and 
many have to (or choose to) make use of other resources 
they bring with them . These may be material resources 
of exchange (financial resources, labour power and skills, 
trading relationships) or various forms of legitimacy 
claims (kinship, client-patron relationships, ideological 
affiliations) . Hansen’s early work on self-settled refugees 
in Zambia especially shows the relevance of cultural and 
social resources .57 An analysis of resources enables us, for 
example, to see cases of co-ethnic integration not as “nat-
ural” occurrences, but rather as examples where negotia-
tion for rights and resources is enabled through various 
existing legitimacy resources including language, cultural 
norms such as reciprocity, kinship ties, and common spirit-
ual-religious origins (ancestors) which act along with other, 
more material considerations .
These resources, however, only facilitate integration if 
they are deemed valuable by local counterparts or used 
by refugees for the purpose of integrating . In Malkki’s 
well-known work on Burundian refugees in Tanzania, for 
example, both camp-based and “town” refugees were of the 
same ethnic group, which was related to some of the local 
ethnic groups . For the “town” refugees this affinity assisted 
with an integration process based on remaining invisible to 
authorities and locals, while for the camp refugees it was 
irrelevant in their quest for a separate “mythico-historical” 
identification as exiles .58
Other useful resources which refugees can use to facili-
tate integration are labour power or their contribution to 
shifting demographic patterns . An increase in popula-
tion density in a previously sparsely populated area can 
help locals attract state services . Bakewell’s comment on 
Zambia applies just as well to Mozambican refugees in 
South Africa:
The arrival of the refugees was regarded positively by Zambian vil-
lagers as not only did they cultivate the bush, but they also boosted 
the population to levels better able to draw in services such as 
schools and clinics . For the chiefs and headmen, the increased 
population also increased their prestige .59
In camp situations, the refugees bring the same poten-
tial economic, social, and political resources with them, but 
there is usually no demand from the side of those in power, 
leaving refugees with fewer bargaining tools . Kinship, lan-
guage, and symbolic ties are usually non-existent with inter-
national actors, whose own prestige is not dependent on 
attracting political clients except to the extent that there are 
a sufficient number of “beneficiaries” who remain passive, 
needy, and controlled . Financial exchanges or individual 
patron-client relationships that develop between humanitar-
ian staff and refugees in camps, which are so often decried as 
corrupt and deviant, should in fact be understood as part of 
the same process by which refugees, just like any other social 
group, use the resources they have and which are in demand 
by those in power to negotiate desired outcomes .
Arguing that refugees claim rights as a negotiation for 
mutual gain with powerful actors, rather than based on 
abstract principles such as “refugee rights,” is not neces-
sarily a purely realist argument . It is in fact a crucial, but 
often unstated, element of idealist debates on accountabil-
ity . Rights are only truly protected if those claiming them 
have a means of sanctioning those with the power to grant 
or withdraw positive freedoms and rights and the power to 
infringe or protect from infringement of negative freedoms . 
Such sanction presupposes a mutual, not entirely one-sided, 
relationship . By being based on local political negotiation, 
which requires a measure of mutuality if not necessar-
ily equality, local integration by definition includes more 
accountability in the relationship between refugees and 
power-holders than camp-based situations, even as refu-
gee rights advocates and academics are arguing for greater 
accountability in humanitarian practice .60
Refugee Strategies and Tactics
Of course, there is no simple or automatic supply-demand 
mechanism of resources for rights; resources are deployed 
by refugees according to particular strategies, depending 
on the desired outcomes and depending on often significant 
constraints . Malkki’s example is useful once again, as the 
“camp refugees,” in contrast to the “town refugees,” did not 
want to integrate locally but rather to develop and main-
tain a group identification centring on return to Burundi . 
They therefore targeted their claims to resources and rights 
at international actors on the basis of their “refugeehood .” 
We do not know what would have happened if those same 
refugees had not had powerful actors like the UNHCR who 
were responsive to this strategy . What other actors would 
they have turned to for food and shelter? Would they have 
had to adopt a different strategy?
Refugees also employ more subtle tactics, such as the 
day-to-day construction of moral legitimacy through 
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the invocation of shared history by Shangaan-speaking 
Mozambican refugees in relation to their Shangaan-
speaking hosts in South Africa .61 While many, even most, 
Mozambican refugees remained extremely poor for twenty 
years after their arrival in South Africa, the mutually 
reinforced identity link with their hosts has meant that they 
have not experienced the often violent xenophobia which 
plagues refugees and migrants in other parts of post-1994 
South Africa .62
Although I have been emphasizing negotiation for 
resources and power as an active process, there are clearly 
different levels of individual or collective agency in the 
choice of strategies and tactics . Some interactions (such as 
bribing a UNHCR status determination official to arrange 
resettlement or offering group allegiance to a chief) are 
more  purposeful and active than others (such as increasing 
the population density of an area) .
This broad model of political negotiation which looks 
at actors, resources, and strategies has several benefits . It 
allows us to describe and compare refugee responses across 
a variety of contexts and times and with a variety of other 
groups of actors, such as vulnerable citizens, internally dis-
placed persons, and economic migrants . It is only seemingly 
paradoxical that a situationally defined approach would 
facilitate comparison; refugee studies has been obsessed 
with classification and labelling so that camp-based refu-
gees are studied differently from returnees, who are again 
imbued with different characteristics to internally displaced . 
This kind of classification without a unifying theoretical 
model does not help to assess the relative achievement of 
rights . I am not proposing negotiated rights as a means of 
understanding local integration only; it is a means of seeing 
local integration as one scenario on a continuum of rela-
tive freedom to negotiate rights which stretches from ware-
housed refugees, slaves, trafficked children, etc . on the one 
end, to fully enfranchised citizens on the other . Along this 
continuum there may be more powerful refugees and vul-
nerable ones, as well as more or less marginalized citizens .
Sometimes, marginal citizens may have fewer rights than 
some refugees living among them, especially if we con-
sider prominent political exiles or members of rebel groups 
befriended with the host state’s government . Sudanese refu-
gees in northern Uganda and Kenya enjoy certain rights 
not by virtue of being refugees, but through their associa-
tion with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebel 
group, which is in political allegiance with the respective 
host governments . SPLA membership cards allow free-
dom of movement in much of Uganda,63 while, in contrast, 
Acholi citizens of Uganda have been resettled to govern-
ment “villages” through a violent constraint of movement 
in the past twenty years . The warehousing critique correctly 
challenges the treatment of all refugees as a homogeneous, 
vulnerable, and dependent group, and the approach of ana-
lyzing the negotiation of rights gives us a means of acknow-
ledging the more powerful as well as the vulnerable .
This negotiating-rights perspective also allows us to com-
pare current negotiations for rights with historical periods 
when international refugee law and human rights concepts 
did not exist as benchmarks . This gives the study of refugee 
flows and responses a much longer historical context and 
allows for more cross-fertilization with historical studies 
in other disciplines . An active, political perspective there-
fore brings refugees “back into history” in more than one 
sense, comparatively over time and by not taking them out 
of a normal process of political change and development 
through refugee labelling and sequestration in camps .64
Local Integration through Refugee Rights?
Using the model of politically negotiated rights, “refugee 
rights” become one of many possible strategies that refugees 
can use to access rights within a set of structural constraints . 
However, claiming “refugee rights” will only be effective as 
a strategy if there are powerful actors present who are likely 
to react positively to this strategy . Some host governments, 
international organizations and NGOs are clearly responsive 
to this strategic claim .65 But even in cases where the organ-
ization most mandated to respond to the claim of refugee 
rights—the UNHCR—is powerful, the legal rights of refu-
gees as set out in the Refugee Convention have often been 
ignored in favour of UN-supported “warehousing .” So the 
invocation of the refugee identification towards institutions 
mandated to respond to that label has just as often led to a 
direct constraint of rights as to an expansion of rights .
As noted above, other common strategies which refugees 
use for claiming access to rights include historical associa-
tion, political allegiance, and ethnic identification . In the 
case of Angolan refugees in the Zambian border regions, 
Bakewell points out that there was an existing historical 
community spanning the formal border . In the absence of 
a strong central state presence in the border communities, 
this historical and ethnic connection was more important 
than differences of formal citizenship in accessing relevant 
resources such as land .66 In terms of political allegiance, the 
case of SPLA members in Uganda is mentioned above .
The case of Mozambican refugees in South Africa serves 
as an example of ethnic identification, claimed in parallel, 
at different points in time, with other forms of legitimacy . 
Shangaan-speaking Mozambicans escaping the civil war 
in the mid-1980s were welcomed and integrated in South 
Africa by the Shangaan-speaking “homeland” government 
(located immediately on the border with Mozambique) as 
ethnic and black brothers in explicit opposition to a racist 
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central state .67 Even though it did not obviate all discrimin-
ation or conflict with locals, ethnic identification was there-
fore an important strategy through which Mozambican 
refugees could access basic local rights (such as access to 
land, low-level employment by local residents, etc .) in the 
first ten years of their stay in South Africa .
After the 1994 transition to democracy in South Africa, 
the ethnic “homelands” were dissolved . Faced with a central 
state that still only had a fledgling refugee rights legislation 
or culture, Mozambicans’ strategy shifted to claiming rights 
from the state (rather than only from local authorities), but by 
identifying themselves as long-term residents from a neigh-
bouring country rather than as refugees per se . In 1995 and 
1996, over 90,000 Mozambican refugees received perma-
nent resident status by virtue of being counted as miners or 
migrants from within the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) . Only in 1999, fifteen years after their 
arrival, did the strategy of claiming “refugee rights” bear 
fruit for Mozambicans in South Africa when a government 
amnesty was specifically oriented around the right to legal 
regularization for Mozambican refugees .68
The negotiation for documentation and rights from the 
state as “migrants” and “refugees” continued to be paral-
leled by a local negotiation for rights from the host com-
munity on the basis of common ancestry and tradition, as 
mentioned above .69 In fact, trying to claim local rights on 
the basis of being a refugee was seen by many Mozambicans 
as being counterproductive . While South African hos-
pitality initially included empathy with the horrors the 
Mozambicans had experienced during the civil war and 
their extreme poverty on arrival in South Africa, this char-
ity soon underpinned an unequal hierarchical relationship . 
To gain expanded access to resources and rights, many 
Mozambicans have worked hard to renounce the need 
for charity, pity, or special treatment on the basis of their 
refugeehood and have made claims for local equality on 
the basis of long-term residence, education level, or South 
African citizenship documents .
Local Integration as Refugee Protection 
Intervention?
People have moved to escape persecution and wars for thou-
sands of years and have always found ways, sometimes with 
ease and more often with much difficulty, of establishing new 
homes among new people, or else moving on until they did . 
Only rarely were those fleeing war welcomed and integrated 
merely because they were displaced by war . Even since the 
invention of the modern refugee regime in the 1950s, most 
local integration has not been the result of a host-country or 
host-community strategy based predominantly on the aim 
of providing refugee protection .
The European Cold War–era refugee regime was cen-
trally about geopolitical and ideological rivalry, rather than 
about humanitarianism .70 In Africa, some refugees were 
welcomed by host states and societies as African brothers 
and neighbours (not as refugees qua refugees) during the 
wars of independence .71 Some, such as the Mozambicans 
in South Africa72 or the Liberians in Cote d’Ivoire,73 have 
more recently been welcomed as co-ethnic brothers (again 
not as refugees per se) . Other refugees have chosen to evade 
the host state’s official refugee protection system and try 
their luck as “undocumented migrants” or pose as locals, 
calculating that there was some greater benefit in this 
arrangement .74 In sum, those who were integrated officially 
were not integrated on the basis of being refugees per se, and 
those who are integrating unofficially feel that their lives 
and chances are better by not being recognized or identified 
as refugees . Neither is therefore really integration on the 
basis of intentional refugee protection .
There are many case studies of local integration where 
the absence of state and international interventions has been 
instrumental in facilitating integration . In Sierra Leone of 
the early 1990s, for example, Leach found that, “in local 
terms, ‘self-settlement’ and ‘integration’ were not special, 
but an inevitable and well-precedented way of dealing with 
[the arrival of Liberian refugees] .”75 Even in the European 
context, Zetter et al . note that “in Italy, the lack of a nation-
ally coordinated framework of policies for settlement and 
control of geographical mobility appears to have the effect of 
facilitating integration and enabling local networks to con-
solidate and support labor market access and social mobil-
ity .”76 When refugees decide not to live in camps but rather 
to self-settle and integrate, they are often avoiding not only 
the specific strictures of the camp setting, but just as much 
the refugee label and concept itself and the involvement of 
external institutional actors in their lives .
There are three questions implicit in the relationship 
between local integration and intentional refugee protection 
interventions . One is whether local integration interventions 
explicitly motivated by refugee protection aims have had a 
good record in facilitating local integration . We have very few 
empirical examples of how well locally integrated refugees 
would do if they were supported by both governments and 
the UNHCR without the presence of additional political or 
institutional interests apart from refugee protection . As men-
tioned above, in those cases where the government explicitly 
welcomed refugees (such as Cote d’Ivoire in the early 1990s,77 
Tanzania of the 1960s,78 or Malawi79) there was little UNHCR 
or NGO assistance and governments had other strategic 
imperatives . We do have evidence of cases where interven-
tions intended for refugee protection have constrained refu-
gee rights and imperiled existing local integration, including 
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various examples of forced encampment of refugees living 
independently in villages or towns .80
The second question is whether local integration has had 
a good record in protecting refugees—i .e ., whether inte-
grated refugees enjoy more rights and freedoms than refu-
gees in other situations . Compared with long-term camp 
sequestration, the anti-warehousing advocates have convin-
cingly argued that local integration is generally preferable in 
terms of basic rights such as the right to free movement, the 
right to work and self-sufficiency, and the right to associa-
tion .81 Others have argued that integration is also preferable 
to nominally self-sufficient settlements which nonetheless 
constrain free movement .82 Still others note that health 
and socio-economic indicators for self-settled refugees are 
generally better than for those in camps .83 Even where the 
economic conditions are more difficult for refugees out-
side camps, many choose to stay outside the camps because 
the freedom to determine their own lives is deemed more 
important than easy access to some services .84
We are left with the third, essentially normative, question 
concerning the relationship between local integration and 
refugee protection: what about those refugees who do not 
have the resources to negotiate for successful integration and 
what about situations where the local actors offer no space for 
refugees to negotiate or indeed attack them? What happens/
would happen to refugees in such situations in the absence of 
an international or national refugee protection intervention 
such as a camp? What about those subgroups considered the 
most vulnerable, and with the least independent resources 
for negotiation, such as unaccompanied children, women 
with small children, or refugees who are ill or disabled? 
What about Goma or Kosovo or Darfur, or any other large-
scale (and high-profile) mass refugee exodus, especially 
where there is ongoing and widespread violence in the areas 
to which people are displaced?
There are undoubtedly contexts in which particular refu-
gees do not and cannot survive without external assistance 
and without the kind of protection provided by a spatially 
separate and securitized camp . However, the existence of 
such particular needs and contexts does not invalidate the 
point of needing to empirically study and understand local 
integration where and when it happens . Furthermore, on 
the normative question of which type of protection (local 
integration or camp) is on average or aggregate better for 
particularly vulnerable refugees in contexts of ongoing vio-
lence or very large-scale movement, this may be impossible 
and indeed dangerous to answer, given the context-specific 
nature of refugee needs, desires, and options .
If we do attempt a review of the available evidence com-
paring the record of camps versus local integration in these 
extreme contexts, we have little clear evidence, as noted 
above, whether encampment interventions have a positive 
or negative effect in balance on refugee welfare, including 
for particular subgroups of refugees . It is even more diffi-
cult to make counterfactual suppositions; i .e ., what would 
it have been like if there were no camps . In order to make 
a counterfactual argument, we would have to take away 
not only the economy of the camps (for the international 
organizations and host states involved), but also the polit-
ical option of camps which host states, host communities, 
and some refugee groups can now use to fall back on inter-
national actors . We would also have to imagine away the 
insidious discursive construction of helpless, dependent and 
burdensome refugees which comes with camps and which 
affects even those refugees who are currently not in camps .
We can look at cases where large-scale refugee move-
ments have been absorbed by hosts without the need for 
camps . Guinea is, to a large extent, such a host country, as 
were Malawi, Tanzania, and also many European countries 
after the Second World War . We can also look at cases where 
refugees, including supposedly vulnerable subgroups, have 
chosen to remain outside available camps and brave the fight 
for survival on their own, or at least without handouts based 
on “refugee rights .” Here we do have evidence that seems 
to show that self-settled refugees suffer less hardship than 
camp-based ones, or are willing to suffer greater economic 
hardship for the added freedoms of self-settlement . We 
should also be doing more comparative work with historical 
migrations, to see how refugees survived, or not, before the 
invention of an international system of refugee rights .
Conclusion
To pre-empt a range of criticisms which a focus on refu-
gee agency and the social and political “normality” of the 
 integration process may potentially and to some extent legit-
imately provoke, let me outline four dangers of this approach . 
First, it may seem to underplay the structural constraints 
which refugees face, most significantly the role of the state 
in deciding on who has rights within its borders . Second, 
it may seem to gloss over the hardship that many refugees 
certainly experience . Third, it could be misunderstood as a 
fatalistic perspective, which holds that if integration happens 
“naturally” it is inevitable, and if it does not happen “natur-
ally” there is nothing which concerned institutions can do 
about it, even if vulnerable people are suffering . Finally, it 
may seem to underestimate the power and importance of the 
legal framework as a potentially progressive and protective 
or constraining and discriminatory force . It is certainly not 
my intention to suggest these things .
In relation to the first two points, I am simply arguing 
that we need to look at both structural constraints and 
hardship situationally in each case of local integration (or 
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where local integration is not happening), and how refugees 
empirically react to and manage them . In looking at how 
refugees negotiate protection, rights, and access to resour-
ces, we should not overlook informal non-state actors (such 
as community leaders, individual local residents, etc .) and 
their roles in protecting and enabling access to rights and 
the management of hardship in the local context . There is 
no suggestion that constraints and hardships do not exist 
where local integration takes place, or that they are a priori 
any greater or lesser than in encampment contexts .
In relation to the following two points—fatalism and 
law—we should be aware that both the dominant power 
structures and the laws which form the basis of the ideal 
refugee protection framework which is often held up as a 
model are, in fact, quite recent inventions, that they are 
not universally experienced, and that they have changed 
significantly in the past fifty, twenty and even five years . 
They will change again . Therefore, in understanding what 
actually happens on the ground, we should not start from 
a prescriptive idea of what should be, how states should act, 
and how the law should function, but rather start from a 
descriptive analysis of how states and communities act and 
how the law functions .
Finally, any comparison of local integration and encamp-
ment as ways of living needs to be clear on what benchmark 
is being applied . The “enjoyment of rights” by refugees is 
often touted as a measure, assessed through welfare indica-
tors such as access to food, health, education, employment, 
etc . But this may be missing much of the point of how refu-
gees experience local integration . The freedom to act polit-
ically and strategically, i .e ., the “freedom to pursue normal 
lives,”85 may be the more important criterion from their 
perspective . The defining characteristic of encampment is 
the constraint of this freedom .
Hovil expresses the significance of freedom well in her 
study of Sudanese refugees in Moyo District, Uganda:
The most striking contrast between those refugees living in settle-
ments and those who are self-settled is not the difference in rela-
tive standards of living, but the response they have to their pre-
dicament . The feeling of powerlessness pervading the interviews 
with settlement refugees stands in direct contrast to those who 
had opted out of the refugee assistance structures and were tak-
ing responsibility for their lives . There is obviously a danger of 
over-romanticising the lives of self-settled refugees . By no means 
are their circumstances easy—not least of all because they are 
not recognized by the refugee assistance structures in operation . 
However, the fact remains that their ability to move freely has a 
positive impact on their lives, allowing them to utilize fully the 
resources around them and make choices based on where they 
exist .86
The actual physical constraint of the camp is matched by 
a much more subtle constraint, which I am arguing against . 
This is the assumption that it is up to “us,” as professionals 
and institutions mandated with refugee protection, to “give” 
refugees freedom to negotiate access to their own rights . 
Justice Albie Sachs, in the introduction to Verdirame and 
Harrell-Bond’s new book, shows how deeply this perception 
sits when he says: “there is a need for giving refugees a far 
more active role in deciding on their future .”87
I have made an argument primarily about how we think 
about refugee responses and responses to refugees, not 
about what specific policy should be followed in response to 
displacement or to facilitate integration . Anti-warehousing 
advocacy campaigners are doing valuable work presenting 
arguments for a change in policy around encampment, 
within the context of the institutional arrangements (and 
the concomitant interests) that we have today . This debate 
against camps is appropriately based on a combination of 
arguments about human rights (contributing to showing 
up the hypocrisy and double standards of an aid system 
supposedly based on this concept), basic welfare, and cost-
benefit analysis, thereby showing that camps do not provide 
a good service to refugees and only an illusory and mor-
ally indefensible service to states and international agencies . 
This campaign is a step in the right direction .
When the follow-on policy question arises, “Well, if not 
camps, what else shall we do with them then?” one can make 
many arguments about human rights, basic welfare, and 
cost-benefit analysis in favour of local integration, and can 
define government and international aid interventions which 
are likely to facilitate or constrain it . These are mainly to do 
with documentation, access to labour markets, and access to/ 
investment in basic services for all residents of a particular 
area, as has already been well-argued in documents such as 
the UNHCR Standing Committee’s “Framework for Durable 
Solutions for Refugees and Persons of Concern,”88 and vari-
ous academic papers .89 It is definitely desirable to raise the 
profile of local integration with refugee rights and advocacy 
organizations who are arguing within the current, dominant 
“durable solutions” paradigm .
But I am also suggesting that academics must take the 
additional step of looking beyond the current institutional 
arrangements and their demands for particular policy justi-
fications .90 Empirical research which does not start from an 
explicit policy perspective is not merely a luxury . Bakewell 
has argued that “research which is designed without regard 
to policy relevance may offer a more powerful critique and 
ironically help to bring about more profound changes than 
many studies that focus on policy issues from the outset .”91 
This is partly because institutions, especially ones special-
ized in crisis management, tend to have short historical 
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memories and therefore tend to assume that things are as 
they are because they cannot be otherwise (or at least that 
only minor policy tweaks here or there are possible) .92 
More importantly, by circling around a policy objective, the 
expert refugee industry is largely talking to itself and tell-
ing itself what it should do rather than considering all the 
actors and options available in real life . This is not in itself 
wrong, as institutions should be taking responsibility for 
monitoring their own interventions and holding themselves 
accountable as much as possible .
However, the problem remains that policy talk is inevit-
ably and by definition skewed toward a consideration of 
existing institutional responses and logics . It is a simple fact 
that the majority of people we may call refugees does not 
actually experience the institutional interventions and logics 
as institutions assume they do . A significant proportion of 
refugees is not in camps and has never been “captured” in 
statistics or target-group specifications . For them, creatively 
negotiating power relations with local power holders is not 
a policy option; it is simply what they do . Even of those who 
are “captured” in the system, only a minority internalize it 
to the extent that they conform to the models institutions 
provide—either in camps or during repatriation drives or in 
local communities . By taking these models as the exclusive 
(explicit or implicit) benchmarks for refugee actions, we, as 
academics, run the risk of “warehousing” refugees not only 
with barbed wire and tents but also with words .
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